References without law book default to BGB.
Case - Feeding Canary
Facts
Andy (A) wants to travel to Spain in three weeks. He asks his neighbor Barbara (B) whether she could feed his canary bird, Carl (C), during his five days of absence. Barbara agrees. They do not talk about any compensation or other consideration for B.
Two weeks later, Barbara wins tickets for Liverpool’s Champions League match against Rome. Overwhelmed by her luck, she tells A about it and that she won’t be able to feed C for at least three days because of the game ahead. A should look for someone else for the task.
A thinks B has to keep her word and demands that she feeds C on all five days. Is he correct?
Solution
Slides Solution
- Issue: A would be correct if they had entered into a valid contract. Thus, is there a valid contract?
- Rule: A contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and, in each case, the intention to enter into a contract with legal binding force.
- Application:
- A. Offer by A:
- Declaration: → (+), A “asked” B.
- Intention to be legally bound: → (+), A wants to be sure that B feeds C.
- B. Acceptance by B:
- Declaration: → (+), B “agreed”.
- Intention to be legally bound: Argumentation necessary.
- Pro: A relies on B’s feeding of C; B knows about that.
- Con: No remuneration; no favor in return; B doesn’t want to be liable if she has to change her intent.
- Conclusion: → (-), it is just a favor.
- Conclusion: There is no valid contract. A cannot demand that B feeds C on all five days.
Write-Up
Issue: Can A demand that B feeds his canary C for five days based on a valid contract?
Rule: For A to have a legally enforceable claim against B, they must have formed a valid contract. A contract requires two matching declarations of intent: an offer (§ 145 BGB) and an acceptance (§ 147 BGB). Both declarations must be made with the objective intention to be legally bound (Rechtsbindungswille).
Application:
1. Offer by A
A asked B to feed his bird during his vacation. This act constitutes a declaration of intent. Since A is depending on someone to feed his bird while he is away, an objective recipient in B’s position could assume that A had an intention to establish a binding obligation to ensure the survival of his pet. Thus, A made an offer.2. Acceptance by B
B agreed to the request, which constitutes a declaration. The critical issue is whether B had the intention to be legally bound. To determine this, her declaration must be interpreted from the perspective of an objective recipient (§§ 133, 157 BGB).Arguments in favor of a legal intent: A relies heavily on B fulfilling this task, as the bird’s life depends on it, and B is aware of this reliance.
Arguments against a legal intent: The arrangement was completely gratuitous—there was no remuneration or reciprocal favor agreed upon. In such everyday neighborhood contexts, a person agreeing to do a free favor typically does not want to assume legal liability or be subject to damages if they are unable or change their mind. An objective observer would recognize that B merely intended to grant a neighborly favor (Gefälligkeit) without assuming a legally binding duty.Therefore, B lacked the necessary intention to be legally bound. Her agreement was merely a social courtesy.
Conclusion: No valid contract was formed between A and B. Consequently, A cannot demand that B feeds C on all five days.